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TRANSPORTATION LAW

RailroadEmployees and Amtrak:
The FreeRide May Continue
by Gary D. Allison
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In 1970, Congress enacted the Rail Passenger Service
Act, which established the National Rail Passenger Service Corp. (AMTRAK) and relieved railroads of their
obligations as common carriers of passengers by contracting with AMTRAK to take over their intercity rail
passenger services. As part of the contracting process,
the railroads, AMTRAK and the Secretary of Labor
were to guarantee railroad employees certain statutory
employment protections.
Originally, the employment protections did not include the free or reduced-rate travel privileges many of
the contracting railroads had provided their employees,
retirees and dependents In 1972, in response to the
complaints of many present and former railroad employees, and at the urging of the contracting railroads
and concerned labor unions, Congress amended the
employment protections to require AMTRAK to initiate
free and reduced-rate travel privileges for certain employees of the contracting railroads and to require the
railroads to reimburse AMTRAK for the travel benefits.
Further congressional amendments to the employee travel provisions in 1979 and 1981 specified a reimbursement formula that requires the contracting railroads to
pay AMTRAK rates in excess of its incremental costs of
providing the statutory employee travel benefits.
ISSUE
This case questions the degree to which the original
Rail Service Passenger Act, and the contracts entered by
the railroads and AMTRAK under the authority of the
Gary D. Allison is a Professorof Law at the University of Tulsa
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providing free and reduced-rate travel benefits to certain of their employees, retirees and dependents.
FACTS
The original provisions of the Rail Passenger Service
Act (Pub. L. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327-42 (1970)) did not
specify whether the venerable practice of providing railroad employees with free passenger service should continue, and if so, who would pay for it. However,
pursuant to the Act, AMTRAK negotiated a "Basic
Agreement" with each railroad involved here, specifying
that:
I. "From and after May 1, 1971, railroad shall be relieved of its entire responsibility for the provision of
Intercity Rail Passenger Service," and
2. "Transportation privileges, if any, with respect to
business and personal travel of railroad personnel
shall be as determined by [AMTRAK]."
Upon initiating its operations, AMTRAK significantly reduced the travel privileges of railroad employees, which provoked immediate protest from concerned
rail unions. Strikes were threatened if the travel privileges were not restored. This labor unrest prompted the
railroads to complain to AMTRAK, which in response,
expanded its travel privileges, but not to the levels previously provided by the railroads.
Eventually, this controversy led to Congress enacting, over AMTRAK's protests, a new provision to the
Rail Passenger Service Act [section 405(1)], requiring
AMTRAK to restore the travel privileges railroad employees enjoyed as of April 30, 1971. Section '105(f) also
required the railroads to reimburse AMTRAK for the
costs associated with the employee travel privileges.
Unable to agree on a cost formula, pursuant to its authority under section 405(f), the Interstate Commerce
Commission set the reimbursement rate at .00079 cents
per passenger mile and permitted these costs to be offset
by revenues collected from railroad employees' paying
half-fares.
Responding to AMTRAK's complaints that the existing travel privilege reimbursement rate was too low, in
1979, Congress amended section 405(0 to statutorily set
the reimbursement rate at 25% of the AMTRAK's systemwide average monthly yield per revenue passenger
mile for a two-year period ending on September 30,
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1981. (AMTRAK Reorganization Act of 1979, Pub. L.
96-73, section 120, 93 Stat. 537, 547-48 (1979)) Congress
subsequently amended secton 405(0 to make the 25%
yield reimbursement formula permanent. (AMTRAK
Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, section
1184, 95 Stat. 357, 697 (1981))
Contending that the 1972 and 1979 amendments to
the Rail Passenger Services Act impaired their contractual rights under the original Rail Passenger Service Act
and the "Basic Agreement" to be relieved of any financial responsibility for employee travel privileges, the
railroad appellees filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Summary
judgment was entered in favor of AMTRAK in an unreported opinion. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh
Circuit held that the railroads' contractual rights were
not impaired by the statutory requirement that they
reimburse AMTRAK for the costs of the employee travel privileges, but that the cost reimbursement method
prescribed by Congress in its 1979 amendment to section 405(f) impermissibly impairs the railroad's contractual rights to be free from responsibility for intercity rail
passenger service because it requires them to reimburse
AMTRAK beyond the costs of the employee travel privileges. (Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. National
R.R. PassengerCorp., 723 F.2d 1298 (1983))
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The social significance of this case is minimal and
could literally disappear should Congress discontinue
funding AMTRAK. In its present posture, the case is
legally remarkable for elevating the concept of incremental costs to the level of constitutional prescription
through the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that payments
in excess of the incremental costs of the employee privileges subsidize AMTRAK's intercity passenger service
operations. The Seventh Circuit's conclusions at e consistent with precedent concerning impairment of contracts. However, the court's rationale for holding that
the impairment here (section 405(f) impairs the railroad's rights tinder the Basic Agreement to be relieved
of all responsibility [or intercity rail passenger service) is
constitutionally impermissible is highly suspect.
Congress ultimately mandated a reimbursement rate
above AMTRAK's incremental costs of service-a rate
the Seventh Circuit held requires the railroads to help
pay for intercity rail passenger service in breach tf their
rights uner the Basic Agreement to be relieved of all
responsibility for intercity rail passenger service. It is
important to consider other cost concepts that are often
used in establishing rates for regulated services. Often
rates are established on the basis of fully allocated
costs-where the company's total costs of service are
allocated to each unit of output on a causally-related
basis. A company's total costs include fixed as well as
Issue No. 15

incremental costs. Payments by one class of customer in
excess of incremental costs reduce the fixed cost coverage responsibilities of other customers. Yet, it would be a
startling proposition to hold that a fully allocated cost
payment subsidizes other customers.
Whether a particular class of customer uses services
that can be causally related to costs other than variable
costs has become an important issue in fully allocated
cost determinations. It has been argued that interruptible and non-peak services do not tax the capacity of the
company to provide service, and therefore should not be
charged with fixed cost coverage responsibilities. The
space-available nature of the employee travel privileges
would qualify employee travel as an interruptible or
non-peak service. Still, the complete absolution of interruptible or non-peak customers from fixed cost responsibility has as yet not achieved universal acceptance
among regulatory agencies authorized to engage in ratemaking-especially in the case of industries such as the
rail passenger industry that has for years experienced
flagging demands for service during peak and non-peak
times.
The congressionally-mandated reimbursement rate
certainly exceeds AMTRAK's incremental costs of providing employee travel privileges. Assuming that it is
rational to charge interruptible or non-peak customers a
rate covering some fixed costs, the mandated reimbursement rate is probably below the fully allocated cost level,
as is the full fares being charged other customers riding
on AMTRAK. In adopting the reimbursement formula
enacted in section 405(f), Congress apparently took into
consideration a General Accounting Office study of how
much AMTRAK should be reimbursed For the employee travel privileges it provides-a study that concluded that value of service should be taken into account
in deciaing what the reimbursement rate should be.
After determining that section 405(f) impairs the
railroad appellees' rights under the Basic Agreement to
be relieved from responsibility For intercity rail passenger service, the Seventh Circuit placed on AMTRAK
and the United States the "burden to establish that,
under the circumstances of this case, Congress' regulation of interstate commerce in this specific statute is, by
virtue of the evidence before it or the courts, paramount
to the rights of the railroads tinder the basic agreement.
Assigning the burden of establishing the constitutionality of federal legislation that impairs a private contract
on those defending the constitutionality of' the legislation runs counter to case precedent.
If the railroads must shoulder this burden, it is unlikely that the Court will find that it is arbitrary anti
irrational for Congress to require parties receiving AMTRAK services to pay rates above AMTRAK's incremental costs of providing those services. It is especially
unlikely that the railroads can meet this burden when
the "contract" they rely on fails to allocate the cost re371

sponsibility of employee travel privileges between them
and AMTRAK.
ARGUMENTS
For National Railroad Passenger Corporation [AMTRAK]
(Counsel of Record, Paid F. Mickey, Jr., 400 N. Capital Street,
NW, Washington, DC 20001; telephone (202) 383-3967)
1. In fixing compensation for Railroad Employee Pass
Privileges, Congress is not limited to incremental cost.
2. Even if the railroads had a contractual right to be free
of all obligations associated with intercity rail passenger service, that right has not been impaired in a
manner prescribed by the Constitution.
ForAtchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co. (Counsel
of Record, George A. Platz, One First National Plaza, Chicago, IL 60603; telephone (312) 853-7000)
1. The release from all responsibility for intercity rail
passenger service is a contractual obligation of the
United States protected by the Fifth Amendment.
2. The payment requirement of section 405(f) impairs
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the release from all responsibility for intercity rail
passenger service because the release includes financial responsibility for employee pass privileges.
3. The payment requirement of section 405(1) impairs
the release from all responsibility for intercity rail
passenger service by compelling the railroads to subsidize AMTRAK's passenger services to the general
public, and is in any event irrational.
4. The impairment of the railroad's contract is not excused by considerations of public policy, lack of reliance, or insubstantiality.
5. There is no need to reach the constitutional issues in
this case because the Basic Agreement constitutes
"another basis for compensation" within the meaning
of section 405(f).
In Support of the NationalRailroadPassengerCorp.
The United States filed a brief emphasizing that
section 405(f) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (hoes not
unconstitutionally impair any contractual right of the
railroads.
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